Ebook Deference to Committees in the Antebellum House
One of the most commonly-observed characteristics of the modern House of
Representatives is that the floor of the House exhibits a high degree
of deference to standing committees’ bill proposals. Indeed, though
there is substantial disagreement about the reasons and implications of
this deference, theoretical and empirical scholars of various stripes
agree that bills reported from committees enjoy high levels of success
during floor consideration. In stark contrast, however, various
historical and political science studies of committees in the earliest
decades of congressional history paint a picture of committees as
subservient agents of the House as a whole, with little independent
influence upon House decision making.
Perhaps surprisingly, given this sharp difference in the perceived role of committees in the legislative process, and given also the centrality of committees in studies of Congress, little work systematically addresses questions about either the timing or causes of the emergence of deference to committee decisions. Some scholars suggest that deference emerged along with the standing committee system itself in the period from roughly 1815-1825, while others suggest that deference still was not the norm as late as the end of the 19 th century.
In this paper I study the question of deference to committees by exploring whether such deference occurred in the decades immediately following the creation of the standing committee system. My goal for this paper is to paint a picture of committee influence and deference that: first, provides insight on whether committees were important veto players in the antebellum law making process; second, helps to flesh out our understanding of the evolution of the legislative process, and of committees’ place therein; third, illuminates the nature of winning and losing coalitions on committees; and fourth, provides evidence that is at least suggestive regarding the (non-) generality of theories of congressional organization developed in the context of the modern House.
More specifically, I examine the frequency with which committees were “rolled”—that is, the House passed a bill that was opposed on final passage by a majority of the members of the committee that had originally reported the bill—on bills within their jurisdictions. Taking each such committee roll as evidence of non-deference to the committee of jurisdiction, I find that the frequency of committee rolls was generally quite low, and was in line with the levels of deference observed in modern congresses (albeit using different measures). I also explore the incidence of rolls among majority and minority party contingents on each committee. I find that majority party committee contingents were rolled more often than were overall committee contingents, though the difference is not dramatic. I find additionally that minority party contingents were rolled decidedly more often than either overall committees or majority party contingents.
I proceed as follows. In the next section, I review the theoretical underpinnings of committee deference in the modern House, as well as claims made regarding the extent of deference in the antebellum House. In the third section, I spell out the methods by which I examine these claims, and in the fourth section I present the results regarding deference. to committees. In the fifth section, I use the same methods to evaluate the extent to which majority and minority party members of committees were rolled on final passage.
Perhaps surprisingly, given this sharp difference in the perceived role of committees in the legislative process, and given also the centrality of committees in studies of Congress, little work systematically addresses questions about either the timing or causes of the emergence of deference to committee decisions. Some scholars suggest that deference emerged along with the standing committee system itself in the period from roughly 1815-1825, while others suggest that deference still was not the norm as late as the end of the 19 th century.
In this paper I study the question of deference to committees by exploring whether such deference occurred in the decades immediately following the creation of the standing committee system. My goal for this paper is to paint a picture of committee influence and deference that: first, provides insight on whether committees were important veto players in the antebellum law making process; second, helps to flesh out our understanding of the evolution of the legislative process, and of committees’ place therein; third, illuminates the nature of winning and losing coalitions on committees; and fourth, provides evidence that is at least suggestive regarding the (non-) generality of theories of congressional organization developed in the context of the modern House.
More specifically, I examine the frequency with which committees were “rolled”—that is, the House passed a bill that was opposed on final passage by a majority of the members of the committee that had originally reported the bill—on bills within their jurisdictions. Taking each such committee roll as evidence of non-deference to the committee of jurisdiction, I find that the frequency of committee rolls was generally quite low, and was in line with the levels of deference observed in modern congresses (albeit using different measures). I also explore the incidence of rolls among majority and minority party contingents on each committee. I find that majority party committee contingents were rolled more often than were overall committee contingents, though the difference is not dramatic. I find additionally that minority party contingents were rolled decidedly more often than either overall committees or majority party contingents.
I proceed as follows. In the next section, I review the theoretical underpinnings of committee deference in the modern House, as well as claims made regarding the extent of deference in the antebellum House. In the third section, I spell out the methods by which I examine these claims, and in the fourth section I present the results regarding deference. to committees. In the fifth section, I use the same methods to evaluate the extent to which majority and minority party members of committees were rolled on final passage.
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